The idea that English nationalism has powered support for Brexit is unduly simplistic and requires re-examination by Kenny, Michael
By Democratic Audit UK 2016-6-22
The idea that English nationalism has powered support for
Brexit is unduly simplistic and requires re-examination
democraticaudit.com /2016/06/22/the-idea-that-english-nationalism-has-powered-support-for-brexit-is-unduly-
simplistic-and-requires-re-examination/
English sentiment has been important to the tenor and character of the Vote Leave campaign, but Michael Kenny
writes there are reasons to be sceptical that English nationalism has had a clear, causal role in the EU Referendum.
He asks whether the picture of the ‘two Englands’ – one progressive and cosmopolitan, the other populist and
nationalist – draws too sharp a distinction between them, and in doing so underplays the extent to which fears about
cultural identity, inequality and immigration are shared in very different kinds of places and communities.
 
“F**k off Europe, we’re all voting out!”. So rang the chant of an inebriated group of English football fans in
Marseilles, earlier this month, according to various press reports. One of the least salubrious contributions to the
Referendum debate seemed to encapsulate the aggression, insularity and xenophobia which some have come to
believe has been injected into the Referendum campaign by a widespread sense of English nationalism.
Various commentators have identified Anglo-grievance as a key dynamic working for Brexit, as a growing number of
English voters, especially those from poorer backgrounds, come to see the Referendum as a way of putting two
fingers up to the metropolitan political elite and some of its most cherished concerns. Writing in The Guardian,
Fintan O’Toole worried that a phoney nationalism lacking the kind of extended cultural discourse and political
articulation that has characterised other ‘normal’ nationalisms, may be about to take the UK out of Europe, and
precipitate a major constitutional crisis within Britain.
And so, the cardboard cut-out of English nationalism has – once more – become an object of fascinated concern for
progressive commentators, just as it did in the wake of the Conservatives’ emphasis during the election campaign of
2015 upon the prospect of an SNP-Labour coalition.
But has English nationalism played such a clear, causal role in the Referendum? There are three good reasons, I
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suggest, for some scepticism about this characterisation.
First, it is important to note that, in some important respects, Euroscepticism is not co-terminous with feelings of
English nationalism. There is pretty significant support for Brexit outside England, and this will play an important part
in the overall vote, including in Scotland. In Wales in particular, polling at the outset of the campaign reported similar
levels of support for Brexit to those in England.
Equally, many see the UK leaving the EU as the chance to regain the UK’s previous role as an outward-facing global
power, unfettered by the binds associated with the EU. These globalists, together with advocates of the virtues of
national self-government, are often uncomfortable with the dog-whistle nationalism associated with other parts of
the Leave campaign. These represent important parts of the coalition of support that has gathered around Brexit.
Second, it is important to appreciate that while there is evidence of some kind of correlation between those English
people who favour Brexit and those who identify entirely or mainly as English, rather than British, in recent polling,
this does not in any way prove that the relationship between the two is a causal one. Indeed, it is more plausible to
think that a stronger sense of Englishness is – like scepticism about the EU – also a manifestation of and response
to a complex set of social and economic change, including globalisation, economic inequality and new forms of
cultural anxiety. To suggest that English nationalism is the force driving scepticism to Europe obscures the deep
underlying trends that make questions of belonging and cultural identity so important to an increasing number of
people – in England and elsewhere.
Third, blaming English nationalism for the popularity of Brexit misses one of the key attitudinal trends at work in the
current campaign – the bifurcation of English opinion. Put simply, while Remain is overwhelmingly the preference of
those who live in some of our largest cities, University towns and large conurbations, Brexit is favoured by those
who live in places cut off from the circuits of economic growth and opportunity, including coastal towns and the
hinterlands of large cities.
Social class too appears to play a major role in determining preferences in this vote, as those from working class
backgrounds (demographics C2 and DE) are reported to be twice as likely to vote for Brexit as Remain, according to
some recent polling. Where you live, how old you are, and the family background you are born into, are much more
important in shaping of attitudes to this momentous decision than how you feel about English culture and tradition.
And so, the idea that English nationalism has powered support for Brexit is unduly simplistic and reflects a deeply
ingrained fear which increasingly requires re-examination.
For sure English sentiment has been important to the tenor and character of the Campaign. Much of the rhetoric of
the Leave campaign — notably the ubiquitous slogan ‘take back control’ – has been carefully tailored to capture a
frustrated, but increasingly palpable, sense of political disenchantment and an incipient ethos of self-government
among many of the English. The language of sovereignty, democracy and identity have all been prominent on this
side of the Campaign, and notably absent from the more prudential and transactional appeals of Remain. The two
sides have been talking in almost entirely distinct political registers, in part from a recognition of the very different
concerns and sensibilities that exist in different parts of England.  What works in Clacton is unlikely, it seems, to
work in Cambridge.
But, there is a danger that this picture of the ‘two Englands’ draws too sharp a distinction between them, and may
underplay the extent to which fears about cultural identity, deepening inequality and worries about immigration, are
shared in very different kinds of places and communities. Indeed this recognition helps us understand something
important about English nationalism. Research shows that over the last two decades it is not just in Boston and
Burnley that this form of nationhood has become more resonant, but also Bath, Bedford and Bromsgrove. This is a
phenomenon that is apparent in very different demographics and communities, and is happening at variable rates in
different parts of England – except in metropolitan London, the last remaining bastion of commitment to a civic form
of Britishness.
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More generally Englishness has emerged in far more varied forms than is typically imagined. It can be corralled into
different kinds of political story, and credibly painted in multi- or mono-cultural terms depending on context and
audience. This is not a tradition that belongs to any one part of the political spectrum but a terrain where the
imagination wanders, and where dreams and aspirations are powerfully asserted and altered. ‘England’ has become
a more politically resonant form of imagined community but the reluctance of the political mainstream to engage and
shape the national stories told about it, have, by and large, left the field free for the kinds of nativist and populist
nationalism that progressives fear.
In fact, a loose, porous but still tangible sense of English nationhood appears to be one of the few cultural trends
capable of connecting people across the divides of class and geography. Building inclusive, modern forms of
nationhood, that span both majority and minority communities, still represents one of the best available buttresses
against the kinds of aggressive nationalism and populism that have become so powerful in the wake of the global
economic crisis of 2007-08. The question now is whether Englishness offers a more promising vehicle for such a
project than a Britishness which has significantly diminished as a source of popular identification.
And yet, such an idea runs against the grain of most progressive opinion, as Anthony Barnett has very recently
demonstrated. As George Orwell famously asked, why is it that so many on the left applaud the nationalisms of
other nations but reach for the ‘little Englander’ tag when confronted with any expression of indigenous patriotism?
It is partly because a growing sense of Englishness is undoubtedly shaped by concerns and feelings about identity,
culture and belonging, as well as an incipient sense of sovereignty and democratic empowerment. And this is why
immigration, rather than constitutional change, is the most iconic and contentious ‘site’ where notions of what it
means to be English and who is deemed to belong there, are expressed and contested. The slogan ‘Take back
control’ has been potent because it speaks simultaneously to these different facets of Englishness, allowing some to
present a high-minded, democratic case and others to craft a highly racialised appeal to fear of ‘the other’.
But the fears and anxieties shaping attitudes to migration cannot adequately be addressed  by naming and shaming
English nationalism. Those on the Remain side of things may have been right, tactically, to stress risk and fear of
economic downturn, but the pejorative and often patronising way in which ‘little England’ has been referenced
throughout the campaign by leading politicians may well come back to haunt them, long after the Referendum result
is announced.
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